Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

A bump on a bump? Emerging intuitions concerning the relative difficulty of the sciences.
In 4 studies, the authors examined how intuitions about the relative difficulties of the sciences develop. In Study 1, familiar everyday phenomena in physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, and economics were pretested in adults, so as to be equally difficult to explain. When participants in kindergarten, Grades 2, 4, 6, and 8, and college were asked to rate the difficulty of understanding these phenomena, children revealed a strong bias to see natural science phenomena as more difficult than those in psychology. The perceived relative difficulty of economics dropped dramatically in late childhood. In Study 2, children saw neuroscience phenomena as much more difficult than cognitive psychology phenomena, which were seen as more difficult than social psychology phenomena, even though all phenomena were again equated for difficulty in adults. In Study 3, we explored the basis for these results in intuitions about common knowledge and firsthand experience. Study 4 showed that the intuitions about the differences between the disciplines were based on intuitions about difficulty of understanding and not on the basis of more general intuitions about the feasibility or truth of the phenomena in question. Taken together, in the studies, the authors find an early emerging basis for judgments that some sciences are intrinsically more difficult than others, a bias that may persevere in adults in subtler forms in such settings as the courtroom. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved)
Counteracting obstacles with optimistic predictions.
This research tested for counteractive optimism: a self-control strategy of generating optimistic predictions of future goal attainment in order to overcome anticipated obstacles in goal pursuit. In support of the counteractive optimism model, participants in 5 studies predicted better performance, more time invested in goal activities, and lower health risks when they anticipated high (vs. low) obstacles in pursuing their goals. These predictions in turn motivated pursuing the goals. These studies further revealed that emphasizing accuracy in predictions reverses the effect of anticipated obstacles on predictions and negatively affects the process of overcoming obstacles in goal pursuit. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved)
How prevalent is wishful thinking? Misattribution of arousal causes optimism and pessimism in subjective probabilities.
People appear to be unrealistically optimistic about their future prospects, as reflected by theory and research in the fields of psychology, organizational behavior, behavioral economics, and behavioral finance. Many real-world examples (e.g., consumer behavior during economic recessions), however, suggest that people are not always overly optimistic. I suggest that people can be both overly optimistic and pessimistic in their beliefs about future events, depending on whether they focus on success or on failure. More specifically, people judge the likelihood of desirable and undesirable events to be higher than similar neutral events because they misattribute the arousal those events evoke to their greater perceived likelihood. I demonstrated this stake-likelihood effect in 4 studies. In Study 1, arousal was shown to increase likelihood judgments. Study 2 demonstrated that such elevated likelihood judgments are due to misattribution of the arousal from having a stake in the outcome. Study 3 demonstrated that such misattribution of arousal occurs for desirable and undesirable events. Study 4 showed the effects of optimism and pessimism on likelihood judgments in a field setting with soccer fans. Together, the findings suggest that wishful thinking might be less prevalent than previously believed. Pessimism might be as likely as optimism in subjective probabilities. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved)
Psychological connectedness and intertemporal choice.
People tend to attach less value to a good if they know a delay will occur before they obtain it. For example, people value receiving $100 tomorrow more than receiving $100 in 10 years. We explored one reason for this tendency (due to Parfit, 1984): In terms of psychological properties, such as beliefs, values, and goals, the decision maker is more closely linked to the person (his or her future self) receiving $100 tomorrow than to the person receiving $100 in 10 years. For this reason, he or she prefers his or her nearer self to have the $100 rather than his or her more remote self. Studies 1 and 2 showed that the greater the rated psychological connection between 2 parts of a participant’s life, the less he or she discounted future monetary and nonmonetary benefits (e.g., good days at work) over that interval. In Studies 3–5, participants read about characters who undergo large life-changing (and connectedness-weakening) events at different points in their lives and then made decisions about the timing of benefits on behalf of these characters. All 5 studies revealed a relation between perceived psychological connectedness and intertemporal choice: Participants preferred benefits to occur before large changes in connectedness but preferred costs to occur after these changes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved)
Perceptual discrimination in static and dynamic noise: The temporal relation between perceptual encoding and decision making.
The authors report 9 new experiments and reanalyze 3 published experiments that investigate factors affecting the time course of perceptual processing and its effects on subsequent decision making. Stimuli in letter-discrimination and brightness-discrimination tasks were degraded with static and dynamic noise. The onset and the time course of decision making were quantified by fitting the data with the diffusion model. Dynamic noise and, to a lesser extent, static noise, produced large shifts in the leading edge of the response-time distribution in letter discrimination but had little effect in brightness discrimination. The authors interpret these shifts as changes in the onset of decision making. The different pattern of shifts in letter discrimination and brightness discrimination implies that decision making in the 2 tasks was affected differently by noise. The changes in response-time distributions found with letter stimuli are inconsistent with the hypothesis that noise increases response times to letter stimuli simply by reducing the rate at which evidence accumulates in the decision process. Instead, they imply that noise also delays the time at which evidence accumulation begins. The delay is shown not to be the result of strategic processes or the result of using different stimuli in different tasks. The results imply, rather, that the onset of evidence accumulation in the decision process is time-locked to the perceptual encoding of the stimulus features needed to do the task. Two mechanisms that could produce this time-locking are described. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved)
How planful is routine behavior? A selective-attention model of performance in the Tower of Hanoi.
Routine human behavior has often been attributed to plans—mental representations of sequences goals and actions—but can also be attributed to more opportunistic interactions of mind and a structured environment. This study asks whether performance on a task traditionally analyzed in terms of plans can be better understood from a “situated” (or “embodied”) perspective. A saccade-contingent display-updating paradigm is used to change the environment by adding, deleting, and moving task-relevant objects without participants’ direct awareness. Response latencies, action patterns, and eye movements all indicate that performance is guided not by plans stored in memory but by a control routine bound to objects as needed by perception and selective attention. The results have implications for interpreting everyday task performance and particular neuropsychological deficits. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved)
Evaluating models of working memory through the effects of concurrent irrelevant information.
Working memory is believed to play a central role in almost all domains of higher cognition, yet the specific mechanisms involved in working memory are still fiercely debated. We describe a neuroimaging experiment with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and a companion behavioral experiment, and in both we seek to adjudicate between alternative theoretical models of working memory on the basis of the effects of interference from articulatory suppression, irrelevant speech, and irrelevant nonspeech. In Experiment 1 we examined fMRI signal changes induced by each type of irrelevant information while subjects performed a probed recall task. Within a principally frontal and left-lateralized network of brain regions, articulatory suppression caused an increase in activity during item presentation, whereas both irrelevant speech and nonspeech caused relative activity reductions during the subsequent delay interval. In Experiment 2, the specific timing of interference was manipulated in a delayed serial recall task. Articulatory suppression was found to be most consequential when it coincided with item presentation, whereas both irrelevant speech and irrelevant nonspeech effects were strongest when limited to the subsequent delay period. Taken together, these experiments provide convergent evidence for a dissociation of articulatory suppression from the 2 irrelevant sound conditions. Implications of these findings are considered for 4 prominent theories of working memory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved)
Stereotype formation: Biased by association.
We propose that biases in attitude and stereotype formation might arise as a result of learned differences in the extent to which social groups have previously been predictive of behavioral or physical properties. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate that differences in the experienced predictiveness of groups with respect to evaluatively neutral information influence the extent to which participants later form attitudes and stereotypes about those groups. In contrast, Experiment 3 shows no influence of predictiveness when using a procedure designed to emphasize the use of higher level reasoning processes, a finding consistent with the idea that the root of the predictiveness bias is not in reasoning. Experiments 4 and 5 demonstrate that the predictiveness bias in formation of group beliefs does not depend on participants making global evaluations of groups. These results are discussed in relation to the associative mechanisms proposed by Mackintosh (1975) to explain similar phenomena in animal conditioning and associative learning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved)
What is the unit of visual attention? Object for selection, but Boolean map for access.
In the past 20 years, numerous theories and findings have suggested that the unit of visual attention is the object. In this study, I first clarify 2 different meanings of unit of visual attention, namely the unit of access in the sense of measurement and the unit of selection in the sense of division. In accordance with this distinction, I argue that an object, as commonly described, is only the unit of selection. The unit of access is better characterized as a Boolean map (Huang & Pashler, 2007), that is, the linkage of a single feature value per dimension associated with a map (i.e., a set of locations). The experiments in this study demonstrated the following: (a) Grouping items into a single object (by connecting them) does not improve the perception of these items (Experiment 1); (b) same-object advantage exists only when the features to be perceived are different dimensions of a single Boolean map and not when they belong to different parts of an object (Experiments 2 and 3); (c) cuing the relevant feature does not help perception when the features to be perceived are different dimensions of a single Boolean map but does help significantly when these features belong to different parts of an object (Experiment 4); and (d) connection, as used in Experiments 1–4, is effective in affecting object structure (i.e., affecting the mechanism of selection) in both an enumeration and a tracking task (Experiments 5 and 6). The results of these experiments, together with data available in the literature, demonstrate that the unit of access is a Boolean map, not an object. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved)
Verbal-spatial and visuospatial coding of number–space interactions.
A tight correspondence has been postulated between the representations of number and space. The spatial numerical association of response codes (SNARC) effect, which reflects the observation that people respond faster with the left-hand side to small numbers and with the right-hand side to large numbers, is regarded as strong evidence for this correspondence. The dominant explanation of the SNARC effect is that it results from visuospatial coding of magnitude (e.g., the mental number line hypothesis). In a series of experiments, we demonstrated that this is only part of the story and that verbal-spatial coding influences processes and representations that have been believed to be purely visuospatial. Additionally, when both accounts were directly contrasted, verbal-spatial coding was observed in absence of visuospatial coding. Relations to other number–space interactions and implications for other tasks are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved)

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General - Vol 139, Iss 1