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Psychological Review - Vol 117, Iss 3

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Psychological Review Psychological Review publishes articles that make important theoretical contributions to any area of scientific psychology.
Copyright 2010 American Psychological Association
  • Correction to Trope and Liberman (2010).
    Reports an error in "Construal-level theory of psychological distance" by Yaacov Trope and Nira Liberman (Psychological Review, 2010[Apr], Vol 117[2], 440-463). This article contained a misspelling in the last name of the second author in the below reference. The complete correct reference is below. The online version has been corrected. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2010-06891-005.) People are capable of thinking about the future, the past, remote locations, another person’s perspective, and counterfactual alternatives. Without denying the uniqueness of each process, it is proposed that they constitute different forms of traversing psychological distance. Psychological distance is egocentric: Its reference point is the self in the here and now, and the different ways in which an object might be removed from that point—in time, in space, in social distance, and in hypotheticality—constitute different distance dimensions. Transcending the self in the here and now entails mental construal, and the farther removed an object is from direct experience, the higher (more abstract) the level of construal of that object. Supporting this analysis, research shows (a) that the various distances are cognitively related to each other, (b) that they similarly influence and are influenced by level of mental construal, and (c) that they similarly affect prediction, preference, and action. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)
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  • The spatial coding model of visual word identification.
    Visual word identification requires readers to code the identity and order of the letters in a word and match this code against previously learned codes. Current models of this lexical matching process posit context-specific letter codes in which letter representations are tied to either specific serial positions or specific local contexts (e.g., letter clusters). The spatial coding model described here adopts a different approach to letter position coding and lexical matching based on context-independent letter representations. In this model, letter position is coded dynamically, with a scheme called spatial coding. Lexical matching is achieved via a method called superposition matching, in which input codes and learned codes are matched on the basis of the relative positions of their common letters. Simulations of the model illustrate its ability to explain a broad range of results from the masked form priming literature, as well as to capture benchmark findings from the unprimed lexical decision task. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)
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  • A dual-stage two-phase model of selective attention.
    The dual-stage two-phase (DSTP) model is introduced as a formal and general model of selective attention that includes both an early and a late stage of stimulus selection. Whereas at the early stage information is selected by perceptual filters whose selectivity is relatively limited, at the late stage stimuli are selected more efficiently on a categorical basis. Consequently, selectivity is first low but then abruptly increases during the course of stimulus processing. Although intended as a general model of selective attention, in the present study the DSTP model was applied to account for the distributional data of 3 flanker task experiments. The fit of the model to the data was not only rather good but also superior to those of alternative single-stage models with a continuously increasing selectivity. All together, the model provides a comprehensive account of how early and late stages of attention interact in the control of performance. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)
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  • Rationales for indirect speech: The theory of the strategic speaker.
    Speakers often do not state requests directly but employ innuendos such as Would you like to see my etchings? Though such indirectness seems puzzlingly inefficient, it can be explained by a theory of the strategic speaker, who seeks plausible deniability when he or she is uncertain of whether the hearer is cooperative or antagonistic. A paradigm case is bribing a policeman who may be corrupt or honest: A veiled bribe may be accepted by the former and ignored by the latter. Everyday social interactions can have a similar payoff structure (with emotional rather than legal penalties) whenever a request is implicitly forbidden by the relational model holding between speaker and hearer (e.g., bribing an honest maitre d', where the reciprocity of the bribe clashes with his authority). Even when a hearer's willingness is known, indirect speech offers higher-order plausible deniability by preempting certainty, gossip, and common knowledge of the request. In supporting experiments, participants judged the intentions and reactions of characters in scenarios that involved fraught requests varying in politeness and directness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)
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  • A biologically realistic cortical model of eye movement control in reading.
    Reading is a highly complex task involving a precise integration of vision, attention, saccadic eye movements, and high-level language processing. Although there is a long history of psychological research in reading, it is only recently that imaging studies have identified some neural correlates of reading. Thus, the underlying neural mechanisms of reading are not yet understood. One very practical requirement of reading is that eye movements be precisely controlled and coordinated with the cognitive processes of reading. Here we present a biologically realistic model of the frontal eye fields that simulates the control of eye movements in human readers. The model couples processes of oculomotor control and cognition in a realistic cortical circuit of spiking neurons. A global rule that signals either “reading” or “not reading” switches the network's behavior from reading to scanning. In the case of reading, interaction with a cortical module that processed “words” allowed the network to read efficiently an array of symbols, including skipping of short words. Word processing and saccade buildup were both modeled by a race to threshold. In both reading and scanning, the network produces realistic distributions of fixation times when compared with human data. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)
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  • Assessing the belief bias effect with ROCs: It's a response bias effect.
    A belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983) is observed when subjects accept more valid than invalid arguments and more believable than unbelievable conclusions and show greater overall accuracy in judging arguments with unbelievable conclusions. The effect is measured with a contrast of contrasts, comparing the acceptance rates for valid and invalid arguments with believable and unbelievable conclusions. We show that use of this measure entails the assumption of a threshold model, which predicts linear receiver operating characteristics (ROCs). In 3 experiments, subjects made “valid”/”invalid” responses to syllogisms, followed by confidence ratings that allowed the construction of empirical ROCs; ROCs were also constructed from a base-rate manipulation in one experiment. In all cases, the form of the empirical ROCs was curved and therefore inconsistent with the assumptions of Klauer, Musch, and Naumer's (2000) multinomial model of belief bias. We propose a more appropriate, signal detection–based model of belief bias. We then use that model to develop theoretically sound and empirically justified measures of decision accuracy and response bias; those measures demonstrate that the belief bias effect is simply a response bias effect. Thus, our data and analyses challenge existing theories of belief bias because those theories predict an accuracy effect that our data suggest is a Type I error. Our results also provide support for processing theories of deduction that assume responses are driven by a graded argument-strength variable, such as the probability heuristic model proposed by Chater and Oaksford (1999). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)
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  • Two-stage dynamic signal detection: A theory of choice, decision time, and confidence.
    The 3 most often-used performance measures in the cognitive and decision sciences are choice, response or decision time, and confidence. We develop a random walk/diffusion theory—2-stage dynamic signal detection (2DSD) theory—that accounts for all 3 measures using a common underlying process. The model uses a drift diffusion process to account for choice and decision time. To estimate confidence, we assume that evidence continues to accumulate after the choice. Judges then interrupt the process to categorize the accumulated evidence into a confidence rating. The model explains all known interrelationships between the 3 indices of performance. Furthermore, the model also accounts for the distributions of each variable in both a perceptual and general knowledge task. The dynamic nature of the model also reveals the moderating effects of time pressure on the accuracy of choice and confidence. Finally, the model specifies the optimal solution for giving the fastest choice and confidence rating for a given level of choice and confidence accuracy. Judges are found to act in a manner consistent with the optimal solution when making confidence judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)
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  • Modeling choice and valuation in decision experiments.
    This article develops a parsimonious descriptive model of individual choice and valuation in the kinds of experiments that constitute a substantial part of the literature relating to decision making under risk and uncertainty. It suggests that many of the best known “regularities” observed in those experiments may arise from a tendency for participants to perceive probabilities and payoffs in a particular way. This model organizes more of the data than any other extant model and generates a number of novel testable implications which are examined with new data. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)
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  • The psychology of intertemporal tradeoffs.
    It is commonly assumed that people make intertemporal choices by “discounting” the value of delayed outcomes, assigning discounted values independently to all options, and comparing the discounted values. We identify a class of anomalies to this assumption of alternative-based discounting, which collectively shows that options are not treated independently but rather comparatively: The time difference, or interval, between the options sometimes counts more and sometimes counts less if it is taken as a whole than if it is divided into shorter subintervals (superadditivity and subadditivity, respectively), and whether the interval counts more or less depends on the money difference, or compensation, involved (inseparability). We develop a model that replaces alternative-based discounting with attribute-based tradeoffs. In our model, people make intertemporal choices by weighing how much more they will receive or pay if they wait longer against how much longer the wait will be, or, conversely, how much less they will receive or pay if they do not wait longer against how much shorter the wait will be. This model, called the tradeoff model, accommodates, in a psychologically plausible way, all anomalies that the discounting approach can and cannot address. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)
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  • Conscious thought is for facilitating social and cultural interactions: How mental simulations serve the animal–culture interface.
    Five empirically based critiques have undermined the standard assumption that conscious thought is primarily for input (obtaining information from the natural environment) or output (the direct control of action). Instead, we propose that conscious thought is for internal processing, to facilitate downstream interaction with the social and cultural environment. Human consciousness enables the construction of meaningful, sequential thought, as in sentences and narratives, logical reasoning, counting and quantification, causal understanding, narratives, and the simulation of events (including nonpresent ones). Conscious thought sequences resemble short films that the brain makes for itself, thereby enabling different parts of brain and mind to share information. The production of conscious thoughts is closely linked to the production of speech because the human mind evolved to facilitate social communication and information sharing, as culture became humankind's biological strategy. The influence of conscious thought on behavior can be vitally helpful but is mostly indirect. Conscious simulation processes are useful for understanding the perspectives of social interaction partners, for exploring options in complex decisions, for replaying past events (both literally and counterfactually) so as to learn, and for facilitating participation in culture in other ways. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)
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  • Operant variability and voluntary action.
    A behavior-based theory identified 2 characteristics of voluntary acts. The first, extensively explored in operant-conditioning experiments, is that voluntary responses produce the reinforcers that control them. This bidirectional relationship—in which reinforcer depends on response and response on reinforcer—demonstrates the functional nature of the voluntary act. The present article focuses on the second characteristic: a similar bidirectional relationship between reinforcement and the predictability/unpredictability of voluntary acts. Support for the theory comes from 2 areas of research. The first shows that levels of behavioral variability—from highly predictable to randomlike—are directly influenced by reinforcers. Put another way, variability is an operant dimension, analogous to response rate and force. The second source of support comes from psychophysical experiments in which human participants judged the degree to which “choices” by virtual actors on a computer screen appeared to be voluntary. The choices were intermittently reinforced according to concurrently operating schedules. The actors' behaviors appeared to most closely approximate voluntary human choices when response distributions matched reinforcer distributions (an indication of functionality) and when levels of variability, from repetitive to random, changed with reinforcement contingencies. Thus, voluntary acts are characterized by reinforcement-controlled functionality and unpredictability. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)
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  • Incubation, insight, and creative problem solving: A unified theory and a connectionist model.
    This article proposes a unified framework for understanding creative problem solving, namely, the explicit–implicit interaction theory. This new theory of creative problem solving constitutes an attempt at providing a more unified explanation of relevant phenomena (in part by reinterpreting/integrating various fragmentary existing theories of incubation and insight). The explicit–implicit interaction theory relies mainly on 5 basic principles, namely, (a) the coexistence of and the difference between explicit and implicit knowledge, (b) the simultaneous involvement of implicit and explicit processes in most tasks, (c) the redundant representation of explicit and implicit knowledge, (d) the integration of the results of explicit and implicit processing, and (e) the iterative (and possibly bidirectional) processing. A computational implementation of the theory is developed based on the CLARION cognitive architecture and applied to the simulation of relevant human data. This work represents an initial step in the development of process-based theories of creativity encompassing incubation, insight, and various other related phenomena. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)
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