Psychological Review

Learners restrict their linguistic generalizations using preemption but not entrenchment: Evidence from artificial-language-learning studies with adults and children.
A central goal of research into language acquisition is explaining how, when learners generalize to new cases, they appropriately restrict their generalizations (e.g., to avoid producing ungrammatical utterances such as *the clown laughed the man; “*” indicates an ungrammatical form). The past 30 years have seen an unresolved debate between statistical preemption and entrenchment as explanations. Under preemption, the use of a verb in a particular construction (e.g., *the clown laughed the man) is probabilistically blocked by hearing that other verb constructions with similar meanings only (e.g., the clown made the man laugh). Under entrenchment, such errors (e.g., *the clown laughed the man) are probabilistically blocked by hearing any utterance that includes the relevant verb (e.g., by the clown made the man laugh and the man laughed). Across five artificial-language-learning studies, we designed a training regime such that learners received evidence for the (by the relevant hypothesis) ungrammaticality of a particular unattested verb/noun + particle combination (e.g., *chila + kem; *squeako + kem) via either preemption only or entrenchment only. Across all five studies, participants in the preemption condition (as per our preregistered prediction) rated unattested verb/noun + particle combinations as less acceptable for restricted verbs/nouns, which appeared during training, than for unrestricted, novel-at-test verbs/nouns, which did not appear during training, that is, strong evidence for preemption. Participants in the entrenchment condition showed no evidence for such an effect (and in 3/5 experiments, positive evidence for the null). We conclude that a successful model of learning linguistic restrictions must instantiate competition between different forms only where they express the same (or similar) meanings. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved)
Episodic retrieval for model-based evaluation in sequential decision tasks.
It has long been hypothesized that episodic memory supports adaptive decision making by enabling mental simulation of future events. Yet, attempts to characterize this process are surprisingly rare. On one hand, memory research is often carried out in settings that are far removed from ecological contexts of decision making. On the other hand, models of adaptive choice only invoke episodic memory in highly stylized terms, if at all. To address these gaps, we propose TCM-SR, a novel process-level model that grounds model-based evaluation in empirically informed dynamics of episodic recall. In this model, the probability of retrieving each available memory is governed by the successor representation, a biologically plausible world model in reinforcement learning. The evolution of these probabilities based on past retrievals, in turn, is dictated by the temporal context model, a prominent model of episodic retrieval. Through simulations and analytical derivations, we show that the patterns of episodic retrieval suggested by this model enables flexible computation of decision variables. On this basis, a number of previously described features of episodic memory might serve an adaptive purpose in sequential decision making. For instance, we show that the contiguity effect, a well-known bias in episodic retrieval, enables mental simulation via model-based rollouts to inform decisions. We also show that backward retrieval and emotional modulation improve generalization and the efficiency of decisions given limited experience. By bridging computational models across these two domains, we make several theoretical and empirical predictions linking episodic memory to adaptive choice in sequential tasks. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved)
Understanding self-control as a problem of regulatory scope.
Although the focus of research for decades, there is a surprising lack of consensus on what is (and what is not) self-control. We review some of the most prominent theoretical models of self-control, including those that highlight conflicts between smaller-sooner versus larger-later rewards, “hot” emotions versus “cool” cognitions, and efficient automatic versus resource-intensive controlled processes. After discussing some of their shortcomings, we propose an alternative approach based on tenets of construal level theory (Trope et al., 2021) that integrates these disparate models while also providing novel insights. Specifically, we model self-control as a problem of regulatory scope—the range of considerations one accounts for in any decision or behavior. Self-control conflicts occur when the pursuit of specific local opportunities threatens the ability to address motivational priorities that span a broader array of time, places, individuals, and possibilities. Whereas a more contractive consideration of relevant concerns may prompt indulgence in temptation, a more expansive consideration of concerns should not only help people identify the self-control conflict but also successfully resolve it. We review empirical evidence that supports this new framework and discuss implications and new directions. This regulatory framework not only clarifies what is and what is not self-control but also provides new insights that can be leveraged to enhance self-control in all its various forms. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved)
Theories of consciousness from the perspective of an embedded processes view.
Considerable recent research in neurosciences has dealt with the topic of consciousness, even though there is still disagreement about how to identify and classify conscious states. Recent behavioral work on the topic also exists. We survey recent behavioral and neuroscientific literature with the aims of commenting on strengths and weaknesses of the literature and mapping new directions and recommendations for experimental psychologists. We reconcile this literature with a view of human information processing (Cowan, 1988; Cowan et al., 2024) in which a capacity-limited focus of attention is embedded within the activated portion of long-term memory, with dual bottom-up and top-down control of the focus of attention. None of the many extant theories fully captures what we propose as the organization of conscious thought at cognitive and neural levels. It seems clear that information from various cognitive functions, based on signals from various brain areas, is integrated into a conscious whole. In our new proposal, the integration involves funneling information to a hub or focus of attention neurally centered in the parietal lobes and functionally connected to areas representing the currently attended information. This funneling process (bringing information from diverse sensory and frontal sources to contact a small parietal area where attended information is coordinated and combined) may be the converse of global broadcasting, from other proposals (Baars et al., 2021; Baars & Franklin, 2003; Dehaene & Changeux, 2011). The proposed system incorporates many principles from previous research and theorization and strives toward a resolution of the relation between consciousness and attention. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved)
Psychological adaptations for fitness interdependence underlie cooperation across human ecologies.
Humans evolved to solve adaptive problems with kin and nonkin across fitness-relevant domains, including childcare and resource sharing, among others. Therefore, there is a great diversity in the types of interdependences humans experience across activities, relationships, and ecologies. To identify human psychological adaptations for cooperation, we argue that researchers must accurately characterize human fitness interdependence (FI). We propose a theoretical framework for assessing variation in FI that applies to the social interactions humans would have experienced across situations, relationships, and ecologies in the ancestral past and continue to experience today. According to this model, FI is characterized along four dimensions: (a) corresponding versus conflicting interests (b) mutual dependence versus independence, (c) asymmetrical versus symmetrical dependence (i.e., power), and (d) coordination. Because humans evolved to be highly mutually dependent on others to solve myriad adaptive problems, even compared to our closest living relatives, there is immense variability in the types of interdependences humans experience in daily life. Here, we describe the kinds of variation in interdependence humans experience, paying particular attention to social life in small-scale societies. In demonstrating the diversity of conflicts and coordination problems humans manage, we contend that humans evolved psychological adaptations to infer from signals, cues, and properties of the environment the four dimensions of FI under degrees of uncertainty to reduce the costs of cooperation. We conclude by discussing the theoretical implications of FI theory and emphasize that when individuals understand that others depend on them, it gives way to a new means of leverage to influence how others behave toward them. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved)
Emotion understanding as third-person appraisals: Integrating appraisal theories with developmental theories of emotion.
Emotion understanding goes beyond recognizing emotional displays—it also involves reasoning about how people’s emotions are affected by their subjective evaluations of what they experienced. Inspired by work in adults on cognitive appraisal theories of emotion, we propose a framework that can guide systematic investigations of how an adult-like, sophisticated understanding of emotion develops from infancy to adulthood. We integrate basic concepts of appraisal theories with developmental theories of emotion understanding and suggest that over development, young children construct an intuitive, theory-like understanding of other people’s emotions that is structurally similar to appraisal theories. That is, children are increasingly able to evaluate other people’s situations from those people’s perspectives along various appraisal dimensions and use such third-person appraisals to understand those people’s emotional responses to events. This “third-person-appraisal” framework can not only incorporate existing empirical findings but can also identify gaps in the literature, providing a guiding framework for systematically investigating the development of emotion understanding. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved)
Correction to “One thought too few: An adaptive rationale for punishing negligence” by Sarin and Cushman (2024).
Reports an error in "One thought too few: An adaptive rationale for punishing negligence" by Arunima Sarin and Fiery Cushman (Psychological Review, 2024[Apr], Vol 131[3], 812-824). In the original article, the copyright attribution was incorrectly listed, and the Creative Commons CC BY license disclaimer was incorrectly omitted from the author note. The correct copyright is “© 2024 The Author(s),” and the omitted disclaimer is present as: Open Access funding provided by University College London: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0; http://creativecommons.org/li censes/by/4.0). This license permits copying and redistributing the work in any medium or format, as well as adapting the material for any purpose, even commercially. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2024-74001-001). Why do we punish negligence? Some current accounts raise the possibility that it can be explained by the kinds of processes that lead us to punish ordinary harmful acts, such as outcome bias, character inference, or antecedent deliberative choices. Although they capture many important cases, these explanations fail to account for others. We argue that, in addition to these phenomena, there is something unique to the punishment of negligence itself: People hold others directly responsible for the basic fact of failing to bring to mind information that would help them to avoid important risks. In other words, we propose that at its heart negligence is a failure of thought. Drawing on the current literature in moral psychology, we suggest that people find it natural to punish such failures, even when they do not arise from conscious, volitional choice. This raises a question: Why punish somebody for a mental event they did not exercise deliberative control over? Drawing on the literature on how thoughts come to mind, we argue that punishing a person for such failures will help prevent their future occurrence, even without the involvement of volitional choice. This provides new insight on the structure and function of our tendency to punish negligent actions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved)
The (absence of the) presence–absence distinction in motivation science.
A focal stimulus (object, end state, outcome, event, experience, characteristic, possibility, etc.) may represent a presence, an occurrence, or something, or it may represent an absence, a nonoccurrence, or nothing. This presence–absence distinction has received extensive and explicit attention in cognitive psychology (it is the central figure), but it has received minimal and primarily implicit attention in motivation science (it is the ground, not the figure). Herein, we explicitly place the presence–absence distinction in the role of figure in a motivational account of behavior, and we do so in the context of the foundational approach–avoidance motivation distinction. We review pertinent literature in cognitive psychology and motivation science, and we provide a model integrating the approach–avoidance and the presence–absence distinctions, along with numerous examples, illustrations, and observations. We believe that attending to the presence–absence distinction in motivation science holds great promise for theory, research, and application, and we encourage researchers to attend to this distinction moving forward. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved)
Learning emotion regulation: An integrative framework.
Improving emotion regulation abilities, a process that requires learning, can enhance psychological well-being and mental health. Empirical evidence suggests that emotion regulation can be learned—during development and the lifespan, and most explicitly in psychotherapeutic interventions and experimental training paradigms. There is little work however that directly addresses such learning mechanisms. The present article proposes that learning in specific components of emotion regulation—emotion goals, emotional awareness, and strategy selection—may drive skill learning and long-term changes in regulatory behavior. Associative learning (classical and instrumental conditioning) and social learning (including observational, instructed, or interpersonal emotion regulation processes) are proposed to function as underlying mechanisms, while reinforcement-learning models may be useful for quantifying how these learning systems operate. A framework for how people learn emotion regulation will guide basic science investigations and impact clinical interventions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved)
Open-mindedness: An integrative review of interventions.
Partisan animosity has been growing in the United States and around the world over the past few decades, fueling efforts by researchers and practitioners to help heal the divide. Many studies have been conducted to test interventions that aim to promote open-mindedness; however, these studies have been conducted in disparate literatures that do not always use the same terminology. In this review, we integrate research on open-mindedness in order to facilitate cross-talk and collaboration between disciplines. We review various concepts related to open-mindedness and then offer a conceptual model to help guide the further development of interventions and research to understand open-mindedness. We propose that open-mindedness is multifaceted and dynamic, such that interventions should focus on targeting multiple psychological pathways in order to maximize and sustain their effects. Specifically, we propose that interventions that target cognitive and/or motivational pathways can induce open-mindedness initially. Then, training in emotion regulation and/or social skills can help to sustain and build on open-mindedness once individuals enter into a situation where their beliefs are challenged. We conclude with a discussion of potential future directions for research on open-mindedness interventions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved)
An entropy modulation theory of creative exploration.
Compared to individuals who are rated as less creative, higher creative individuals tend to produce ideas more quickly and with more novelty—what we call faster-and-further phenomenology. This has traditionally been explained either as supporting an associative theory—based on differences in the structure of cognitive representations—or as supporting an executive theory—based on the principle that higher creative individuals utilize cognitive control to navigate their cognitive representations differently. Though extensive research demonstrates evidence of differences in semantic structure, structural explanations are limited in their ability to formally explain faster-and-further phenomenology. At the same time, executive abilities also correlate with creativity, but formal process models explaining how they contribute to faster-and-further phenomenology are lacking. Here, we introduce entropy modulation theory which integrates structure and process-based creativity accounts. Relying on a broad set of evidence, entropy modulation theory assumes that the difference between lower and higher creative individuals lies in the executive modulation of entropy during cognitive search (e.g., memory retrieval). With retrieval targets racing to reach an activation threshold, activation magnitude and variance both independently enhance the entropy of target retrieval and increase retrieval speed, reproducing the faster-and-further phenomenology. Thus, apparent differences in semantic structure can be produced via an entropy modulating retrieval process, which tunes cognitive entropy to mediate cognitive flexibility and the exploration–exploitation trade-off. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved)

Psychological Review - Vol 132, Iss 1